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I. INTRODUCTION
Public trust and respect for legal institutions is a fundamental
component of a successful democracy1 and vital in any postrevolutionary
government. According to Judge Wayne Brazil, this trust and respect can
be fostered through high-quality mediation programs that provide disputants
with a fair and equitable alternative to litigation and nonfacilitated
settlement. 2 However, mediation also requires this public trust and respect
for legal institutions for the process to function effectively as an alternative
to litigation. For instance, in the United States mediation has been utilized
to relieve court congestion, 3 provide alternative services that are less costly
and time consuming to parties than traditional litigation, 4 and to allow for
discussion and settlement of a broader range of issues than the legal system
1 See Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structures for the Delivery of ADR Services by
Courts: Critical Values and Concerns, 14 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 715, 739
(1999) (positing that the most effective court model is one in which a high-quality court
mediation program is staffed by court neutrals) (footnotes omitted).
2 See id.
3 See Harry T. Edwards, Hopes and Fears for Alternative Dispute Resolution, 21
WLLAMErE L. REv. 425, 436 (1985). But see Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury
Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary
Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 366, 393 (1986) (stating that increased filing fees to
cover court costs would be a better solution to court congestion than creating new ways
to settle lawsuits before trial).
4 See Catherine Cronin-Harris & Peter H. Kaskell, How ADR Finds a Home in
Corporate Law Departments, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LrIG. 158, 170-71
(1997) (noting that in a Center for Public Resources Institute (CPR) survey of 69 large
corporations, 71% experienced significant cost savings while 78% had faster results in
the resolution of the disputes, and 72% reported savings in executive time); Leonard L.
Risldn, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 34 (1984) (observing that
mediation is cheaper and faster than adversary processing because it is not constrained
by procedural or substantive law). But see STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPuTE
RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 162 (2d ed. 1992)
(stating that mediation costs should not automatically be compared with litigation costs,
but instead mediation should be compared with what is most likely to occur in any
given situation, e.g., unassisted negotiation).
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can provide through litigation. 5 The key to understanding mediation here is
that it is an alternative forum; parties understand that if mediation fails they
can resort to our well-established legal system to settle their disputes based
on procedural equality and substantive fairness. While one's ability to pay
for high-quality legal services remains an impediment to fully achieving this
equality and fairness, overwhelming numbers of Americans believe in the
idea of equal justice as the cornerstone of our legal system. 6
In contrast, the emerging postsocialist legal institutions in central and
eastern Europe have neither this base of well-established procedural
equality nor substantive fairness in both statutory and common law. In
addition, the peoples of central and eastern Europe exhibit high degrees of
mistrust towards the people who administer their legal institutions. Given
this backdrop of mistrust, is mediation a viable and desirable process in
central and eastern Europe? In other words, can this alternative means of
dispute resolution function at an effective level without a well-established
and procedurally fair legal institution behind it?
This Note will analyze the legal climate that exists in central and eastern
Europe today and try to answer this question of whether mediation is a viable
process. Part II will discuss the current legal system against the backdrop of
socialism, outlining both institutional and societal problems integral to
determining whether mediation should be encouraged as an alternative to
litigation. Many central and eastern European countries currently have
various mediation programs in place-these will be described and analyzed
in Part III. Based on the issues addressed in Part II and on the current
examples of mediation in this new central and eastern Europe, Part IV will
discuss the benefits and disadvantages of mediation in resolving these
societal and institutional problems. Specifically, can mediation assist in
resolving these problems, or will it impair the transformation from
communism to a democracy by diverting attention away from the essential
goals of establishing a viable legal system? Part V will determine whether,
given the strained relationship between these legal institutions and the
5 See DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPuTEs: EFFEcTivE STRATEGIES FOR
LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS § 2.1.5, at 54-55 (1996). Golann notes that although
lawyers focus on the legal issues in a case, parties may be unable to settle because of
psychological factors, distress over their soured relationship with the opposing party, or
simply miscommunication because of conflicting bargaining styles. See id.
6 See Steven Keeva, Demanding More Justice: Whether Americans Get What They
Want from the Legal System Depends on Its Ability to Stretch Limited Resources,
A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 46, 47 (citing an American Bar Association (ABA) Journal-
Gallup poll that found that 96% of Americans believe in equal justice, while only 14%
felt that the legal system actually provided that type of justice).
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people, mediation programs should be implemented through the legal system
or through private entities. Finally, Part VI will conclude that mediation is a
viable and desirable process that can educate parties about responsible
decisionmaking and ease the painful transition from communism to
democracy.
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL SYSTEM
AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF SOCIALISM
The Berlin Wall fell in 1989, heralding abrupt and often violent
revolutions throughout central and eastern Europe.7 As new governments
established themselves and their ideals, the central and eastern European
countries began the slow and cumbersome transition from state run legal
institutions to institutions based on a particular blend of democratic
principles. As their governments changed, the people of central and eastern
Europe began to raise political and theoretical questions regarding the
formulation of a new set of social values in these emerging democracies. 8
Unfortunately, in establishing new governments after the overthrow of
communism, most people in central and eastern Europe have not
understood that "they had to vote not only against communism, but more
precisely for other politicians, and for other ideologies." 9 This ideological
7 For a firsthand account of the events surrounding these revolutions in central and
eastern Europe, see generally MORT ROSENBLUM ET AL., MOMENTS OF REvOLUTION:
EASTERN EUROPE (1990).
8 See Richard Starets, Hungary: Building the Ethics of Democracy, INSIGHTS ON
GLOBAL ETHIcs, Mar. 1993, at 1, 1 (positing that Hungary must address issues
regarding these new social values as well as procedural difficulties of establishing a
new government, economic problems in the transformation to a free-market economy,
and the critical dangers of a new nationalism).
9 Id. at 2 (discussing Hungarian voters in the elections of 1990). Hungarian
parliamentary member Peter Hack describes this situation as "an ethical vacuum" in
which "everything that was claimed bad by communism became good." Id. In Poland,
voters who originally just wanted the Communists out of power are increasingly unsure
about the current amorphous parties because rather than focusing on voters' economic
concerns, the parties rely on political ideology that the electorate neither understands
nor embraces. See Jane L. Curry, Which Way is Right?, TRANSITIONS, Oct. 1997, at
74, 74-75.
In contrast, the Czech and Slovak dissidents who inaugurated the "velvet
revolution" were clear in their desire to establish a "new order [that] would found its
moral credentials on the decency of the transformation." Ronald F. Lipp, After the
Revolution, 1 LIBERTY 25, 9 (July 1998) <http://ella.sirs.com>. Led by current
President Vaclav Havel, these dissidents wanted to "show the world by example what a
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vacuum demonstrates that transforming a legal system from one that
addresses state concerns to one based on democratic ideals is simply not
enough tQ transform a society, for the people also must be transformed.
This Part deals with the following two issues: that of institutional change
and that of societal change.
A. Legal Institutions: From Socialism to Democracy
Under socialism, "the state was the expression of the dictatorship of the
proletariat" and "could hardly act contrary to its own interests." 10
Independent judicial review of state action was nonexistent; the system
simply could not legally accommodate differences of opinion between the
state and the people. Technically speaking, the state did permit nominal
judicial review of state action; however, judicial allegiance to the interests
and goals of the state resulted in a system that was patently corrupt.
According to the Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "[g]overnment officials
would telephone judges to request particular rulings in cases of interest to
the Party."" This practice became so widespread that the judiciary
essentially became the lackey of the state, and instead of dispensing justice,
provided the state with a farcical arena for the legitimization of its policies.
Given this historical system of subservience to the needs and goals of
the state, the central and eastern European judiciaries are currently engaged
in a painful transformation. Essentially, they must evaluate ingrained and
accepted modes of practice at all levels, and evolve from their traditional
role as governmental "yes men" to architects who must play an integral
humane and morally uplifted society might be." Id. (paraphrasing President Vaclav
Havel). Unfortunately, current Czech citizens now view democracy and capitalism as
having the "same sort of essential corruption that existed under the old regime." Id.
16.
10 Justice Robert F. Utter & David C. Lundsgaard, Judicial Review in the New
Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Some Thoughts from a Comparative
Perspective, 54 OMO ST. L.J. 559, 573 (1993). The authors note that many socialists
considered judicial review to be a primary example of bourgeois attempts to invalidate
socially beneficial legislation solely to benefit their own economic situations. See id. at
573-74.
11 Hon. Sandra Day O'Connor, A Tribute to Professor Immel, Address at the
Ceeli Award Ceremony and Luncheon, ABA Annual Meeting, in 42 ST. Louis U. L.J.
715, 717-18 (1998). This judicial-executive alliance continues under the current
systems as well. As Associate Justice O'Connor notes, "[i]n the civil law tradition, the
courts fall under the umbrella of the executive branch ministry of justice, which can
easily lead to some of the former abuses." Id. at 718.
260
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role in determining the constitutionality of state initiatives. This transition is
understandably difficult. According to a Hungarian observer, the current
judiciary often "appears unfit to make the necessary adjustments in the
form of creative judge made-law [sic]," and "[t]he public feels that judges
avoid decision making." 12 Another difficulty is that most judges have
occupied their positions under socialism. For example, before the Czech-
Slovak divorce in 1993,13 the situation there was exacerbated by "[a]n
acute shortage of experienced judges who [were] not compromised by their
judicial records under the communist regime .... "14 Similarly, the Polish
legislature recently passed a statute "disciplin[ing] judges who made
politically influenced rulings during the Communist era .... "15
In addition to this problem of a compromised and often recalcitrant
judiciary, many central and eastern European courts are constitutionally
barred from independently deciding whether to grant certiorari. For
example, "[tlhe right to initiate constitutional review [in Romania] is
reserved for a few political figures who usually belong to the same majority
which passed the challenged statute." 16  Similarly, the Bulgarian
12 Andras Sajo, The Judiciary in Contemporary Society: Hungary, 25 CAsE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 293, 300 (1993) (noting that although Poland's Solidarity Movement
has been able to increase the judicial ranks with legal professionals who had not worked
under the Communist regime, other countries in central and eastern Europe must still
rely on the judiciary in place under communism).
13 See New Slovak Government Hopes to Rejoin EU Fast-Track, Agence France-
Presse, Oct. 30, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16629490. For a discussion of this
"velvet divorce," see Giles Milton, How the Other Half is Living .... Mail on
Sunday, Nov. 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 14345087.
14 Lloyd Cutler & Herman Schwartz, Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia: E
Duobus Unum?, 58 U. Cm. L. Rv. 511, 539 (1991). "The Czech republic alone is
said to be short at least 330 judges. One hundred were dismissed after November 1989,
and another 120 left voluntarily, with only 115 new judges appointed to replace them."
Id. at 539 n.72 (citing JAN OBRMAN, REHABILITATING POITnCAL VIcTIMS: REPORT ON
EASTERN EUROPE 5, 7 (1990)).15 Peggy Simpson, Law Seeks Purge of Poland's Judges, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 2,
1998, at A12 (stating that President Aleksander Kwasniewski has petitioned the Polish
Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of the statute).
16 Rett R. Ludwikowski, Fundamental Constitutional Rights in the New
Constitutions of Eastern and Central Europe, 3 CARDozo J. INT'L & COMP. L. 73, 123
(1995) [hereinafter Ludwikbwski, Fundamental Constitutional Rights]. Ludwikowski
asserts that the selection of the form of constitutional review has become "one of the
most controversial issues in the constitutional debate across East-Central Europe," with
most countries rejecting the American approach in favor of those of Austria, Germany,
or France. Id. at 160-61. However, in a later article, Ludwikowski states that the end
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Constitutional Court may only exercise its reviewing power "if no less than
one-fifth of the national representatives, the president, the Council of
Ministers, the Supreme Court of Appeals, the Supreme Administrative
Court or the Prosecutor General initiate it."17 These qualifications on the
judiciary's ability to grant certiorari understandably result in mistrust
between the people and the judiciary because only those statutes the
executives allow to be reviewed will be reviewed.
Given these restrictions, current legal systems of central and eastern
Europe have both institutional and personnel problems with regard to their
ability to embrace fully democratic ideals of procedural equality and
substantive fairness. These problems understandably have resulted in legal
institutions that have neither the trust of the masses nor the necessary
support from other branches of government. Some of these issues have
procedural solutions. For example, judicial review limitations may be
overcome through constitutional amendments. Similarly, concentrated
efforts in legal and judicial education can train a new and uncompromised
judiciary. In contrast, the question of trust between the people and the
judiciary has no such procedural or easily definable solution except perhaps
time and experience under the new system. Assuming that this mistrust is
deeply felt and may not be ameliorated in the near future, it may be a
significant barrier to societal and political transformation.
B. Complete Societal Transformation from Communism to
Democracy: Is This Possible?
Just as the judiciary currently inspires mistrust, political leaders of
central and eastern Europe are viewed with suspicion. This attitude towards
the government has its roots in the population's experiences under
communism. For example, two well-known expressions in communist
Czechoslovakia are as follows: "[tihey pretend to pay us, we pretend to
work"; and "[hie who does not steal from the State, steals from his
family."' 18 Also demonstrating this profound mistrust, during a Slovakian
presidential campaign in 1998, the opponent to President Merciar began a
contest entitled "Bomb 98" to see if constituents could guess which election
result of constitution making in central and eastern Europe has been the adoption of an
amalgam of various constitutional models. See Rett R. Ludwikowski, "Mixed"
Constitutions-Product of an East-Central European Constitutional Melting Pot, 16
B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1998).
17 Ludwikowsi, Fundamental Constitutional Rights, supra note 16, at 107.
18 Lipp, supra note 9, 8.
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tricks the incumbent would employ in the last forty-eight hours of the
election.19 And in Romania, Foreign Minister Adrian Severin "was forced
to resign after failing to substantiate allegations that senior politicians were
foreign agents .... "20
Although history provides many reasons for this widespread mistrust
(i.e., many current political leaders have been compromised by past records
under communism), 21 human psychology also provides a rationale.
According to biologist Mary Clark, mistrust of current political leaders and
the judiciary is typical behavior for people in postrevolutiop countries. She
asserts that although political systems can be replaced, the ways in which
people internalize and understand justice and fairness are not as easily or
quickly changed. 22 Essentially, the human brain cannot possibly store every
19 See id.
20 Anatol Lieven, Romania Mired in Feuds: Party Rivalries Have Raised Doubts
About Prospects for Reforms, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 27, 1998, at 31.
21 For example, in Czechoslovakia, dissidents included "more than 500,000
Communist Party members [who] had been expelled from the party... following the
1968 Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia that crushed the Prague Spring reform
movement." Jiri Pehe, Reshaping Dissident Ideals for Post-Communist Times,
TRANSITION, Feb. 21, 1997, at 6, 6. These dissidents objected to Soviet-run
communism rather than communism itself. After the velvet revolution, "[d]iffering
views on how to deal with former collaborators and people tainted by political activities
under the former regime demarcated the main dividing line within the former dissident
community." Id. at 7. The failure of the leadership to acknowledge the past political
activities of current political leaders did much to alienate the public, who
understandably felt that such leaders could not be trusted.
In Poland, politicians split on the issue of whether the country should screen
people in important government posts to learn whether they were communist secret
police collaborators. See id. at 7-8.
In contrast to the Polish and Czech situations, communists in Bulgaria and
Romania "simply ousted their top leaders, changed their parties' names, and claimed to
be democrats." Jane L. Curry, Communists Turned Social Democrats, TRANSrroNS,
Oct. 1997, at 78, 79. This transition was accomplished so smoothly in Romania that the
country in 1992 was still unsure if the executions of Nicolae and Elena Ceausecu in
1989 and the subsequent fall of that government were a coup d'6tat by rival communists
or a true revolution by the people. See Romania Seems Unwilling to Confront Realities
of '89, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Dec. 20, 1992, at 12A. Of course, this
unease dates back to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917; while communists believed that
this was a true revolution by the people, Western scholarship has "treated the October
seizure of power as a Bolshevik coup rather than a popular revolution...." SHEILA
FrrZPATRICK, TE RUSSIAN REvOLUTION: 1917-1932, at 4 (1982).
22 See Mary E. Clark, Symptoms of Cultural Pathologies: A Hypothesis, in
CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRACTICE: INTEGRATION AND APPLICATION 43,
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image it receives throughout one's lifetime. Those images and impressions
it does choose to receive are selected to a large extent based on our
culture. 23  Clark defines these images and impressions as one's
"worldview," and maintains that "changing the worldview of an entire
culture means changing all the expected patterns of daily personal
interaction and all the institutions that make up social life."24 Given the
difficulties inherent in questioning every facet of one's life, this seemingly
extraordinary mental task is not possible for everyone. Indeed, Clark posits
that "not all worldviews are equally adaptive." 25 For these reasons,
political revolutions that seek to radically change the way people interact
with one another seldom bring about lasting social change.26
Hungarian legal scholar Csaba Varga echoes Clark's assertion
regarding the difficulties of social change by positing that no one
"socialized according to the Soviet pattern can step over Marxism by a
simple pronouncement or decision." 27 These observations are especially
important in the context of the prerevolutionary central and eastern Europe,
because information regarding the noncommunist world was restricted and
replaced with propaganda and misinformation. 28 In addition to prohibiting
any foreign travel to the West, travel within these countries required
substantial governmental approval. 29 As a result, central and eastern
52-53 (Dennis J.D. Sandole & Hugo van der Merwe eds., 1993) (positing that
comprehensive social change requires participation in that change at every level through
the only mechanism that will force our brains to accept new ideas: face-to-face
conversation).
23 See id. at 44-45.
24 1d. at 45.
25 Id.
26 See id. at 52.
27 Csaba Varga, Transformation to Rule of Law from No-Law: Societal Contexture
of the Democratic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe, 8 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 487,
504 (1993) (positing that preconceptions formulated under Marxism must be
reevaluated at national and individual levels for the survival of postsocialist systems).
28 See ROLAND N. STROMBERG, EUROPE IN THE TWENTIMTH CENTURY 383 (2d ed.
1988).
29 See Stanislaw Frankowski, The Procuracy and the Regular Courts as the
Palladium of Individual Rights and Liberties-The Case of Poland, 61 TUL. L. REV.
1307, 1313-14 (1987) (discussing conspicuous absence of "freedom of movement and
travel, including the right to choose one's place of residence"); Burt Neuborne &
Steven R. Shapiro, The Nylon Curtain: America's National Border and the Free Flow
of Ideas, 26 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 719, 719-20 (noting travel bans in Hungary
demean the human spirit).
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Europeans' experiences and life impressions were even more uniform than
the worldview of a society in which information is freely available and
travel restrictions are nonexistent.
Due to this difficulty of viewing the world free from cultural limitations
that were essential to one's survival, postrevolutionary legal systems must
fit somehow within the prerevolution pattern of living. In the context of the
Stalinist re-creation of Soviet society, a Muscovite observer in the 1930s
noted that "with the individual and the nation jumping, also their past will
leap. History won't be left on the other side. "30 And in the contemporary
context of the Hungarian transformation from Goulash communism to a
parliamentary system, Hungarian legal scholar Csaba Varga asserts that
because social institutions have meaning only in their relationship with
society, the national past and tradition must form the foundation and
context for emerging legal institutions. 31 Essentially, the ways in which
people understand justice and fairness in a democratic context must
somehow be linked to how they understood those concepts under
communism.
In summary, the judiciary is tainted by past association with
communism and current restricted powers of review. As a result, current
legal institutions in central and eastern European countries do not embody
the democratic ideals of procedural equality and substantive fairness
necessary for a truly just system and are mistrusted by the people. Yet, as a
Hungarian observer has written, "the success of any legal renewal ... can
be guaranteed only by full social and political support." 32 In other words,
although institutional failings may be ameliorated through constitutional
amendments and judicial education, changing the way people view social
institutions is the hardest part in achieving lasting- social change. 33
Considering that the basis of effective mediation is rooted in the presence of
a fair and just legal system, it becomes apparent that this prerequisite of full
social and political support is particularly relevant to our inquiry regarding
the role of mediation in the transformation from socialism to democracy..
30 Varga, supra note 27, at 498 n.19 (citing ERvIN SINKO, EGY REGENY REGENE:
MOszKvAi NAPLOIEGYZETEK (1935-1937) [THE NOVEL OF A NOvEL: A Moscow
DIARY (1935-1937)], at 320 (Istvan Bosnyak ed., 1985)).
31 See id. at 498.
32 Id. at 494.
33 See Clark, supra note 22, at 52.
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III. CURRENT MEDIATION PRACTICES IN
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
Given this deeply felt mistrust and the subsequent precarious situation
of legal institutions in central and eastern Europe, an essential question is
whether an established and fully functional mediation program can alleviate
either problem. Prior to answering that question, it is necessary to examine
whether current mediation efforts in central and eastern Europe are helping
to alleviate these problems. This Part gives an overview of these efforts and
serves to highlight which uses of mediation central and eastern European
governments believe to be valuable in their societies.
Although not widely practiced, most central and eastern European
countries employ some form of mediation. For purposes of this Note, and
to reach some conclusion about the viability of mediation to resolve internal
disputes that might otherwise be litigated, mediation studied here will be
those processes used by the central and eastern European countries
themselves, rather than international mediation of their disputes by foreign
neutrals.
Most mediation in central and eastern Europe is organized and
implemented by the executive branch of government. For example,
mediation in Bulgaria currently consists of the state selecting public agents
to mediate disputes between it and other countries, 34 and the state selecting
private companies to mediate the privatization of publicly owned
corporations. 35 In Romania, mediation has been used by many state actors,
34 See Cabinet to Discuss Credit Agreement with Japan, PARI Daily, Oct. 5,
1998, available in 1998 WL 9451980 (stating that "the cabinet will select procedural
mediators representing the country regarding the credit agreement with the Japanese
Exim Bank, as well as the agreements on rescheduling Bulgaria's debts to Japanese
banks"); see also Bulgaria, Macedonia Can Settle Language Argument Without Help,
July 5, 1998, PARI Daily, available in 1998 WL 9450448 (rejecting German efforts to
mediate their dispute with Macedonia, and stating that "[a]s a country of self-respect
Bulgaria has the powers and opportunities to solve the problem without
mediation. . ."); Talks on Russian Gas Supplies to Bulgaria Start, Interfax (Moscow),
Mar. 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL 9503905 (stating that mediation by businessmen
for Bulgaria did not succeed in reaching agreement between Russia and Bulgaria).
35 See, e.g., Buyer of Kremikovtsi Steel Plant to Be Chosen by the End of 1998,
New Europe On-Line, Aug. 7, 1998, available in 1998 WL 24016376; see also Iva
Ivanova, Vitosha Works Goes Private by End-June: Raiffeisen Investment and Atkins
Currently Consulting Sales of Gorubso, Dyuni, Roussalka, PARI Daily, Apr. 26, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 9449787.
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including the following: by the President in disputes arising among
Romanian political parties; 36 by state agencies in labor-management
disputes; 37 and by agencies as a tool to calm violent local ethnic conflicts. 38
In Hungary, the newly formed National Service for the Mediation and
Arbitration of Labor employs ninety-eight mediators;39 however, no
instances of mediation have yet been reported.
In contrast, neither the Czech nor Slovak republics have any
government-sponsored mediation, although the Czech Republic is currently
considering a victim-offender mediation program through a probation and
mediation service.40 Poland also lacks any government-sponsored
mediation, although the Archbishop of the Polish Catholic Church has
successfully mediated an economic labor strike. 41
In addition to government mediation, many individuals and
organizations involved in dispute resolution have begun teaching mediation
techniques in central and eastern Europe. For example, in Brasov,
36 See Romanian Leaders, Rivals Begin Talks, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 18,
1990, at 15A (stating that President Ion Iliescu mediates between leaders of the
National Liberal Party and Prime Minister Petre Roman); Romanian Opposition Party
"Breaks Links" with President, New Europe On-Line, Sept. 22, 1998, available in
1998 WL 24017396 (noting Social Democrats accuse President Emil Conistantinescu of
"failure to fulfill his duty of 'mediator' among social and political forces").
37 See Richard L. Holman, Strike Halts Trains in Romania, WALL ST. J., June 15,
1993, at A14 (explaining that the Transport Ministry mediated economic strike of
32,000 workers).
38 See Romanian Leaders Meet Opponents, Discuss Coalition, L.A. TIMREs, Dec.
18, 1990, at A14. Partners for Democratic Change, an American mediation
organization, also has helped facilitate meetings between local governments and the
Roma (Gypsies), successfully settling such disparate conflicts as police discrimination
and the inability of 70 Roma families to pay their rent and utility bills to the
government. See Kinga G6ncz & S~ndor Gesk6, Ethnic Minorities in Hungary:
Democracy and Conflict Resolution, ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., July 1997,
at 28, 34-36.
39 See Philip Dine, D.C. Gets Taste of St. Louis Pride, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Sept. 5, 1997, at 3C; see also Cory R. Fine, Starting from Scratch: ADR Helps Resolve
Labor Conflicts in the New Hungary, Disp. REsOL. J., Jan. 1995, at 74, 76 (noting that
mediation would require the parties to submit written proposals to the mediator and
would occur only after conciliation or unassisted negotiations between the parties).
40 See Daniel W. Van Ness & Pat Nolan, Legislating for Restorative Justice, 10
REGENT U. L. REv. 53, 82 (1998) (noting that the Czech service is modeled after the
Probation Assistance Association in Austria).
41 See Polish Auto Strike, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1992, at 5 (noting that
mediation of representatives of Archbishop Damian Zimon successfully resolved the
automobile plant strike).
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Romania, a private U.S. mediator recently taught classes in mediation
techniques. 42 Similarly, in the Czech Republic private mediators and
educators currently educate selected principals and teachers about conflict
resolution in the schools.43 In Poland, mediators from Canada, the United
States, and New Zealand have gathered to discuss family law mediation, 44
while a Baltimore religious organization has visited to help implement
student mediation. 45 Finally, Partners for Democratic Change, a private
nonprofit corporation in the United States, has established university-based
conflict resolution centers in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and
Bulgaria. 46 These centers offer courses in mediation in universities in
Budapest, Warsaw, Prague, and Bratislava.47
In short, countries in central and eastern Europe are currently
employing mediation through the executive branches to resolve such
conflicts as labor disputes, ethnic violence, political infighting, and
privatization. International groups are also teaching conflict resolution
procedures in selected universities throughout central and eastern Europe.
At this point, mediation has not developed its full potential for resolving
conflicts between individuals, although educational efforts are attempting to
alleviate this situation. For this reason, the question remains as to whether
mediation can help achieve lasting social change by giving people the tools
42 See Chris Olson, Mediators Help Settle Disputes, Check the Alternatives:
Mediation Services in the Midlands, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug. 13, 1995, at 1F.
43 See Jon Glass, Foreign Educators Get Lessons in Democracy, VIRGINIAN-PILOT
& LEDGER STAR, Feb. 18, 1995, at B1 (noting that organizer Jitka Jilemicka believes
that educators need to "teach pupils for future life and communicating and talking about
feelings and what you do with your feelings, like anger").
44 See Reporters' Notebook, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 25, 1997, at B4 (stating that 11
members of the Citizen Ambassador Mediation Delegation met in Krakow to discuss
family law issues in Poland).
45 See Adam Katz-Stone, We All Have to Find Our Own Way: Paul Kaplan of the
Hannah More Center Believes He Strengthens Interfaith Communication in Church,
BALTIMORE JEWISH TIMEs, Apr. 18, 1997, at 30 (noting that Paul Kaplan "visited
Poland to help the Polish Psychological Association introduce student mediation
programs in that country").
46 See Eric Brazil, S.F. 's Great Peacemaker Takes on E. Europe Community
Boards: Founder Teaches New Democracies How to Compromise, S.F. EXAMINER,
Jan. 27, 1992, at B3 (quoting founder Raymond Shonholtz, who explained that under
communism, "those who were not in the social scheme were enemies, and those who
had a conflict with the state were social deviates .... Democracy requires
fundamentally different attitudes, which require compromise in conflict situations.
That's a big psychological adjustment.").
47 See id.
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they need to successfully manage their own disputes. A related but distinct
question is whether mediation will operate as an asset or a hindrance in the
emerging postsocialist legal institutions.
IV. BENEFITS AND DISADVANTAGES OF MEDIATION IN
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
Mediation has been implemented in the United States to relieve .court
congestion and to decrease costs to the parties in terms of time and
money.48 Although these are important goals in central and eastern
European countries as well, the problems identified in previous Parts
concerning the lack of an adequately trained and unbiased judiciary
necessitate the elevation of other distinct goals for mediation. According to
one scholar, mediation programs in central and eastern Europe should not
attempt to emulate American mediation, but should "emphasiz[e] the
importance of needs assessment and empowerment of parties in creating
social change." 49
Essentially, issues of fairness and equality in a legal system are more
critical than are those of case management and time to disposition. This
Part analyzes these issues and their possible solutions in central and eastern
Europe, including the critical issue of whether mediation will siphon off
important cases that should be resolved in public by the judicial system. In
addition, mediation is analyzed as a step towards self-government and
democracy.
A. Fairness and Equality Issues Within Mediation Generally
In his seminal article Against Settlement, Professor Fiss outlined several
fairness and equality problems in the settlement of individual cases outside
of the protection of the judicial process. 50 Specifically, Fiss noted that the
stronger party may coerce settlement, that either party may lack the
requisite authority to settle, and finally, that the lack of a trial makes
subsequent judicial involvement problematic. 51 While these concerns are
valid, mediation does not automatically mean the subversion of the ideals of
48 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
49 Ilano Shapiro, Beyond Modernization: Conflict Resolution in Central and
Eastern Europe, ANNALs AM. AcAI. POL. & Soc. Sci., July 1997, at 14, 24.
50 See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YAE L.J. 1072 (1984)
(arguing that settlement may preclude justice to the parties and future disputants).
51 See id. at 1075.
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equality and fairness. Instead, because mediation is premised upon
consensus, it gives individual parties freedom to creatively resolve their
differences and the complete power to accept or decline a proposed
settlement. 52 Given equal understanding of the alternatives, this ability to
accept or decline puts the parties on an equal footing in the decisionmaking
process. Inclusion of counsel in the mediation session further diminishes
any power imbalance, because each lawyer will advocate for her client's
best interests in the dispute. 53 In addition, the mediator can refuse to
continue with the process if a power imbalance threatens to coerce either
party into settlement.
Regarding Fiss's concern that parties may not have ultimate authority to
settle the dispute, the mediator can either refuse to begin the sessions until
all parties have settlement authority or schedule additional sessions to allow
a party to communicate with those individuals needed to finalize any
settlement. Lastly, while private settlement of a dispute may make judicial
involvement at a later date more difficult than involvement at the appellate
level, suggesting that all disputes necessarily should be litigated is
nonsensical. 54 In other words, simply because a dispute enters the judicial
system is insufficient reason to allow that system to preclude parties from
settling simply because the case may ultimately re-enter that system.
B. Mediation Can Serve as an Alternative Process to Avoid
Current Systemic Problems in Legal Systems of Central and
Eastern Europe
In central and eastern Europe these issues of fairness and equality
represent two significant drawbacks to litigation in the postsocialist legal
institutions. First, judges use formal and mechanical approaches based on
"seemingly arcane civil law principles rather than the merits" of a
particular dispute. 55 As discussed previously, the current judiciary was
52 See Memorandum from Josh Stulberg, Professor of Law, The Ohio State
University College of Law 1 (Aug. 27, 1998) (arguing against Fiss's position in
Against Settlement) (on file with author).
53 See Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant
Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1371
(1995) (advocating inclusion of lawyers in mediation sessions in order to present logical
and well-reasoned accounts of a dispute).
54 See Stulberg, supra note 52, at 1.
55 Ethan S. Burger et al., Resolving Commercial Disputes in Russia and Ukraine:
Will Mediation Be a Viable Option?, 16 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LImG. 67, 67
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trained under a strict party-centered system and naturally has difficulty
learning how to fashion opinions based on abstract principles of justice and
equality. Second, successful plaintiffs have considerable difficulty in
enforcing favorable rulings given difficulties in "locating defendant's
assets, deficiencies in applicable legislation, and a shortage of skilled and
motivated court personnel." 56 These procedural difficulties stem from the
disarray inherent in any system designed primarily for the benefit of the
state instead of the benefit of the individual. In short, these procedural
impediments result in a system in which judicial holdings often fail to
adequately address the specific dispute in litigation and damage awards are
theoretically valid but practically impossible to enforce.
Given these systemic problems in postsocialist legal systems, an
effective mediation program may satisfy the needs of parties desirous of an
efficient process facilitated by a neutral third party. Mediation is relatively
inexpensive and essentially needs only the mediator to initiate, conduct, and
conclude the process. Because of this, judicial and court staff inadequacies
become largely irrelevant to the process. This contrast could encourage
parties to fashion their own creative solutions to disputes by concentrating
on the particular merits of that dispute so as to avoid the over
generalization and reliance on arcane and often irrelevant statutes used by
the judiciary.
In addition to overcoming judicial and legislative inadequacies,
mediation permits discussion and resolution of a broader range of issues
than any legal system can provide. 57 For example, legal systems require
that only legal causes of action be argued. In contrast, mediation allows the
parties to discuss the emotional impact of a dispute and often to include
apologies in the settlement agreement. 58 Furthermore, in mediation, parties
can negotiate over logistics of any payment agreed upon in a settlement
agreement. Because the parties can bargain for acceptable schedules,
including time, place, method of payment, and amount of each payment,
(1998) (advocating the use of mediation for commercial disputes involving Western
investors and central and eastern Europeans).
56Id. at68.
57 See GOLANN, supra note 5, § 2.1.5, at 54-56.
58 See Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using
Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIo
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 269, 344 (1999).
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compliance with these agreements is generally as high or higher than
compliance with court-ordered awards. 59
Finally, the difficulties involved in training mediators, however
extensive, do not even approach the inherent difficulties of re-educating the
judiciary. Even if cost were not a factor,60 this re-education requires a
significant amount of time before there is widespread acceptance among the
judiciary. In contrast, mediation training can produce qualified neutrals
ready to help parties resolve disputes within weeks of initiating training
sessions. This crucial decrease in time allows court administrators to
methodically re-educate the judiciary while simultaneously offering parties
a neutral process that can help them resolve their current disputes.
C. A Carefully Constructed Mediation Program Will Not Necessarily
Divert Cases with Possible Value as Important Precedents Away
from Litigation
Another problem noted by Fiss in his critique of mediation in general is
that mediation subverts the main goals of the judiciary to "explicate and
give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the
Constitution and statutes." 61 Common-law systems depend upon well-
defined and comprehensive precedents, and, Fiss contends, mediation
necessarily precludes this development of important precedents. 62 This fear
would be intensified in countries with embryonic case law and a dearth of
such well-defined precedents. According to Varga, this transition period
from socialism to democracy is "a historic time for developing standards
and making them conventional step by step." 63 In other words, this is a
time when legal systems desperately need to embrace and decide
59 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 155-56 (discussing mediation research
in a variety of contexts).
60 Western lawyers have volunteered their time and expertise to courts in central
and eastern Europe. See Theodore R. Kupferman, Judicial Independence Implies
Judicial Responsibility, N.Y. L.J., June 27, 1996, at 2 (noting that lawyers traveled to
Poland as part of the "American Bar Association's Central & Eastern European Law
Initiative (CEELI) to explain our judicial system and meet with and discuss with Polish
judges ... [the adoption of] a Code (similar to the American Bar Association's Model
Code and New York's) of Judicial Ethics and foster judicial independence"); see also
supra note 44 and accompanying text.
61 Fiss, supra note 50, at 1085.
62 See id.
63 Varga, supra note 27, at 492.
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fundamental disputes in order to establish the courts as defenders of the
democratic values of fairness and equality. The fear articulated by Fiss is
that mediation might siphon off these potentially important disputes. ,
One method for answering this challenge of reserving important cases
for litigation lies in careful case selection for mediation at intake. For
example, many U.S. state legislatures have passed statutes providing for
mandatory mediation of divorce, yet exclude mediation from cases
involving critical public policy issues. 64 Other states rely on legally trained
intake officers (or mediators) to sift through cases and offer mediation
services only to, those whose profiles meet statutory standards. 65 Yet
another method is to provide future funding for mediation programs only if
adequate evaluation is done to ensure that the program is following
requisite guidelines for case selection. 66 Evaluation could take the form of a
control group study or analysis of exit surveys asking qualitative questions
of both participants and the mediator and could be undertaken by either a
mediator or an outside social scientist. 67
Using some or all of these methods of case selection, central and
eastern European courts could use their discretion to refer cases to
mediation. This discretionary power would allow courts to flag cases that
were important to the development of their case law and exclude those from
any mediation program. Ability to wield this power would mean that the
courts had a measure of control over any mediation process and might
mandate that a program be annexed by the legal system into something
similar to our court mediation programs. However, given the possible
judicial bias discussed previously in Part II.A., significant problems arising
from possible judicial bias might arise should the courts be given exclusive
control over the process. In order to alleviate this tendency towards bias,
the parliaments of central and eastern Europe could provide appropriate
statutory guidelines regarding case selection.
64 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 9 (stating that legislatures enacted these
types of control mechanisms to ensure fairness and justice in alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) processes).
65 See NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, PoLICY AND
PRACTICE § 6:03, at 3 (2d ed. 1992).
66 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 9.
67 See DAvID A. DOYLE, COURT OF APPEALS FOR FRANKLIN COUNTY, DESIGNING,
IMPLEMENTING AND MAINTAINING AN APPELLATE MEDIATION PROGRAM 8-9 (1999) (on
file with author).
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D. Mediation As a Means of Facilitating and Encouraging
Democracy
In addition to the benefits a well-managed mediation program can bring
to an emerging legal system that is fraught with both corruption and apathy,
mediation has the potential to encourage and educate participants in the
value of responsible decisionmaking. As one mediator noted while talking
with Russian dignitaries interested in establishing mediation centers,
learning mediation techniques is "taking 'the first step toward
democracy .... When you are resolving disputes, you are governing
yourself. "68
For countries under socialism, this idea that parties can resolve their
own disputes is both exhilarating and frightening. For example, central and
eastern Europe has always been a hotbed of ethnic conflict, with ethnic
hatreds dating back more than 2000 years. Currently, ethnic conflict has
"displaced the transition from a planned to a market economy as the central
stumbling block in the making of Eastern European constitutions." ' 69 In
addition, as described earlier, central and eastern Europeans have lost trust
in both their own elected leaders and in a democratic system.70 This subpart
briefly describes the suppression of these ethnic conflicts and analyzes why
current central and eastern European peoples may have difficulty adjusting
to the transformation from socialism to democracy. Mediation is then
offered as a process for reducing ethnic strife and lessening those
difficulties of the political and social transition.
1. Suppression of Ethnic Conflict in Central and Eastern
Europe
The list of peoples that have conquered various parts of central and
eastern Europe is lengthy. It includes the Holy Roman Empire, the Franks,
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Soviet
68 Sacramento Center to Help Russians Implement Mediation Programs, 7 WORLD
ARB. & MEDATION REP. 130, 130 (1996) (reporting that Russian officials had
observed the Sacramento Mediation Center and invited President Tinti to go to Russia
later that year to help them establish their own mediation centers in the State of Kaluga)
(quoting statement of Sacramento Mediation Center Board President Thomas Tinti).
69 Richard A. Epstein, All Quiet on the Eastern Front, 58 U. Cm. L. REv. 555,
567 (1991).
70 See generally Part II.B.
[V/ol. 15:1 1999]1
MEDIATION AND POSTSOCIALIST LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE
Socialist Republic, to name only the larger entities. 71 The resulting influx
of peoples created ethnic strife by forcing antagonistic groups to live in
close proximity. These empires largely contained and suppressed ethnic
conflict, primarily because under these authoritative rules the peoples of
central and eastern Europe were granted little freedom to express
themselves individually, ethnically, or nationally. It only has been when
this authoritative control over society was eliminated that central and
eastern Europeans were able to fight amongst each other. Accordingly, with
each transition from empire to individual countries, these ethnic conflicts
have erupted.
One glaring modern example of this ethnic strife is the turmoil of
former Yugoslavia, both the current turmoil and the Balkan crisis that
precipitated World War I. In addition, in Bulgaria, President Zhelyu Zhelev
warned that "'Bulgarian democracy is being challenged by the brute
ugliness of nationalism and chauvinism.' 72 In Hungary, Parliament
member Peter Hack maintained that the "reversal from the homogeneous
and centrally planned communist society has resulted ... in the upsurge of
tensions that plague an individualistic society: racism, crime, and malignant
nationalism." 73 And in Romania, perhaps the most intolerant of all central
and eastern European countries towards the Roma (Gypsies), violent attacks
against that group go unpunished and are not condemned by the public.74
Given this current meteoric rise in ethnic conflict, the ability of central
and eastern Europeans to deal with conflict at all levels is crucial.
Unfortunately, due to the strong authoritative control under socialism for
the last two generations, individuals in central and eastern Europe are not
accustomed to governing their own conduct beyond acquiescing in or
protesting governmental control. Acquiescing simply meant keeping silent
and agreeing to any governmental plan.75 Protesting governmental control
71 See generally C. WARREN HOLLISTER, MEDIEVAL EUROPE: A SHORT HISTORY
(5th ed. 1982); see also Zvi Gitelman, The Nationalities, in DEvELOPMENTS IN SOVIET
PoLmcs 137, 150-51 (Stephen White et al. eds., 1990) (providing an analysis of the
Soviet system that is readily transferable to the former Central and Eastern Blocs).
72 Bulgaria Wary of Ethnic Strife: Socialists Ripped for Inciting Hostility Toward
Turks, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm., Nov. 4, 1991, at A5 (quoting statement of Bulgarian
President Zhelyu Zhelev).
73 Starets, supra note 8, at 2.
74 See Zoltan Barany, Grim Realities in Eastern Europe, TRANSITION, Mar. 29,
1995, at 7, 7.
75 See Raymond Shonholtz, Strengthening Transitional Democracies Through
Conflict Resolution: Conflict Resolution Education, Training, and Global Development,
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci., July 1997, at 9, 9 (stating that under socialism,
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meant "saying no, disobeying laws ... and going to jail." 76 Essentially,
dissidents were "uncompromising absolutists."' 77 In contrast, life under a
democracy requires the art of compromise through negotiation 78 and
finding ways to recruit people to one's cause, even if that means including
their concerns with that cause.
For instance, the Solidarity Movement in Poland effectively utilized the
technique of mass strikes in order to mobilize the people against
socialism.79 Yet once in power, Solidarity leaders experienced great
difficulties in maintaining that public trust and negotiating in the daily
routine of government. 80 Essentially, Solidarity won the battle for
independence through uncompromising heroism yet lost the war through
their inability and unwillingness to compromise in democracy.
Unlike the forced suppression of conflict under socialism, democracy
views conflict as "one of its most constructive engines for organizing;
unifying opinion; creating opposition; and expressing value, truth, and
understanding." 81 Rather than forced acceptance of the superiority of one
particular view, (i.e., that of the party under socialism) democracy can be
seen "as the development of the legitimacy of laws and the reasonableness
of individuals" to understand that "several truths can exist
individuals were forced to wear an "emotional mask of passivity to avoid exposure to
or confrontation with authoritarian agencies when experiencing disagreement with state
decisions").
76 Michael T. Kauffman, From Dissidence to Dissonance, TRANsrrON, Feb. 21,
1997, at 5, 5 (describing how former dissidents under socialism lost their status in
postrevolutionary society because of their inability to compromise and work
collaboratively with others outside of an "underground" setting. Essentially, dissidents
are often unable to thrive in democratic institutions and therefore have failed to
maintain the support of the people.).
77 Id.
78 See Brazil, supra note 46, at B3 (recalling founder Raymond Shonholtz's
statement that "[t]he deepest reality is that you can't run a democracy without
negotiating"); see also Kauffman, supra note 76, at 5.
79 See Brazil, supra note 46, at B3.
80 See id.; see also Curry, supra note 9, at 74 (describing the fragmentation of the
Solidarity party into numerous groups and the return of former communists to power in
the elections of 1993).
81 Raymond Shonholtz, The Mediating Future, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
Sci., July 1997, at 139, 140 (advocating the creation of mediation modalities to
transnational and multinational conflicts).
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simultaneously." 82 Thus, in order to establish and maintain successful
democracies, central and eastern Europeans must learn how to govern
themselves using not only acquiescence and dissent, but compromise.
2. Lack of Trust in Political Leaders of Central and Eastern
Europe
Unfortunately, ethnic conflict is not the only problem impeding central
and eastern Europe's transition from socialist to democratic institutions.
Another problem in the current relationship between central and eastern
European peoples and their governments is the extremely low public trust
in political leaders. For example, according to a Czech political advisor, the
Czech people have lost faith in their leaders and are "somewhere between
cynicism and despair, [and] no one has support to do anything . * 83
This lack of public support endangers the postsocialist legal institutions
because "the success of any legal renewal ... can be guaranteed only by
full social and political support."84 The pressing question is how the legal
system can gain the trust of the people in such a volatile and complex
situation.
One way to gain this trust is to change the current anti-authoritative
culture. Biologist Mary Clark has said that to change a political and social
culture, society must do what we are biologically designed to do best, talk
and listen.85 According to her, our brains "work best when we engage in
conversation," and merely listening to political speeches "is no substitute
for face-to-face conversation." 86 Therefore, in order to change the
worldview of the people of central and eastern Europe from the well-known
and familiar one of cynicism and despair under communism, they must
engage in group discussions at all levels.
82 Dusan Ondrusek, Conflicts in Transforming Society and the Nongovernmental
Sector: The Slovak Example, ANNALs AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci., July 1997, at 40,
41 (positing that open dialog about these differing truths is necessary to the continuance
of democracy).
83 Lipp, supra note 9, 17.
84 Varga, supra note 27, at 494.
85 See Clark, supra note 22, at 53.
86 Id.
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3. Mediation Can Help Reduce Ethnic Strife and Ease
Participants Through Political and Social Transition
Unlike litigation, with its emphasis on legal discussions among lawyers,
mediation generally requires parties to interact with each other face-to-face,
and in so doing, essentially obligates each to treat the other with respect
and dignity. According to one scholar, mediation assists parties to develop
"a new and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will
redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward one another." 87 Conflict
becomes an opportunity for creative solutions in mediation by challenging
participants to expand their problem-solving skills, form new methods of
interacting with each other, and discuss difficult and often painful issues
with the idea that mediation is an opportunity to improve current
conditions.88
The benefits of such face-to-face mediation sessions in central and
eastern Europe are substantial. By talking with one another face-to-face in
these sessions, mediators can help parties understand each other's
perspectives and encourage them to find solutions that both sides can
embrace. Essentially, mediation could enable parties of different ethnic
backgrounds to come to terms with past conflict and to learn how to live
together peacefully, one person at a time. As a prerequisite to these
resolutions, each side could participate in a "recognition of injustices and
resulting historic wounds, and acceptance of moral responsibility where
due." 89 According to one scholar, this airing of past injustices is crucial to
resolving ethnic strife and can be facilitated most successfully by
mediators. 90
In addition to helping resolve ethnic conflicts, mediation can help
establish a baseline of trust between the governments and the people by
holding group discussions at all levels of government. This group
discussion is essential to the survival of the newly formed governments, yet
it must be organized and, at the very least, have governmental approval.
For example, Perestroika attempted to open up channels of communication
87 Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 305,
325 (1971).
88 See MARK ANSTEY, PRACTICAL PEACE-MAKING: A MEDIATOR'S HANDBOOK 17
(1993).
89 Joseph V. Montville, The Healing Function in Political Conflict Resolution, in
CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRACTICE: INTEGRATION AND APPLICATION, supra
note 22, at 112.
90 See id. at 113.
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between the people and the Communist party in the former Union of Soviet
Socialist Republic (U.S.S.R.). 91 Unfortunately, Gorbachev failed to
provide for appropriate forums in which these communications safely could
take place and did nothing to change the dearth of experience or education
in open and public discussion. 92 Fundamentally, the U.S.S.R. had no
"structures, no culture, no attitudes or [no] techniques for dealing with the
free discussion" generated by the lifting of restrictions on speech. 93
According to one observer, Perestroika failed and the Soviet Union
collapsed due to this inability of the people effectively to communicate their
concerns to the government. 94
Central and eastern Europe reflected this lack of "a public space for
dialogue between citizens and between the citizens and the government." 95
In order to forestall a collapse of central and eastern European
democracies, these countries should encourage and organize mediators to
hold public fora for the benefit of both government and the people. In these
meetings, citizens could explain what they wanted in a democracy, while
government officials could respond by explaining what they thought was
possible. The mediator could be able to translate demands from either side
into understandable language that facilitated settlement of the issues.
In Hungary, psychologists are in an excellent position to provide these
mediation services. This is because under socialism, only psychiatric
hospitals experimented with open group meetings as a type of self-help
mechanism to improve patient health. Psychologists found that these open
meetings between staff and patients actually improved patient mental health
in that it allowed patients to talk openly about their concerns for the first
time in their public lives. Essentially, patients were being trained in the art
of conflict resolution. After the fall of socialism, Hungarian psychologists
have gravitated towards the public sector to teach these skills learned in the
group meetings. These include "ways to communicate effectively, accept
feedback, recognize the positive potentials of conflict, work with small
groups and communities, represent participants' interests, create clear
contracts, and develop realistic expectations and shared responsibility in
decision making." 96
91 See Brazil, supra note 46, at B3.
92 See id.
93 Id.
94 See id.
95 G6ncz & Gesk6, supra note 38, at 30 (noting that Hungarians under socialism
were unable to express their opinions openly for fear of government retaliation).
96 Id. at31.
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For these forums to be effective, both the public and the government
need to be trained in dispute resolution techniques. In addition to the skills
listed above, the techniques would include individual education in active
listening skills, and group training in "consensus decision
making .... team building, and generating problem resolution options
through brainstorming . . . -97 These role-plays will force participants to
re-examine communication styles and choose among those best suited to
functioning in a democracy.
Essentially, central and eastern Europeans need experience in
negotiation and compromise in order to maintain their democracies and can
achieve a certain level of comfort in these processes through public forums
designed to facilitate open and constructive communication. One scholar
has posited that the use of conflict resolution in public fora can "assist in
analyzing dysfunctional or nonfunctional institutions and policies ... and
facilitate the envisioning of acceptable alternatives for organizing new
structures." 98 The forums will help all sides to learn that democracy
requires that both the government and the people take responsibility for
maintaining these open channels of communication.
V. SHOULD MEDIATION PROGRAMS BE IMPLEMENTED THROUGH THE
LEGAL SYSTEM OR THROUGH PRIVATE ENTITIES?
The benefits of fashioning one's own creative solution with the aid of a
neutral third party may cause unanticipated problems in postsocialist
countries. For example, the very informality that makes mediation efficient
may have special problems in central and eastern Europe. According to a
Hungarian scholar, socialist societies relied on the formal procedures of the
legal system almost exclusively and considered the informality inherent in
alternative dispute processes to be "a menace to the rule of law." 99 This
identification of "lay justice" 00 with corruption presents a formidable
9 7 CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 126 (1996) (describing techniques involving ADR in
preventing disputes at the individual, group, corporate, community, and national
levels).
98 Shapiro, supra note 49, at 25 (arguing that conflict resolution can complement
modernization efforts in central and eastern Europe).
99 Sajo, supra note 12, at 300 (noting that under socialism there was an automatic
denial of informal methods).
100 Id.
[Vol. 15:1 1999]
MEDIATION AND POSTSOCIALIST LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE
barrier to widespread acceptance of informal procedures such as mediation,
particularly if mediation is viewed as a circumvention of the legal system.
In addition, the pressing lack of trust the public feels toward central and
eastern European governments makes it an imperative goal for
governmental action to become trustworthy. According to Judge Wayne
Brazil, a high-quality court mediation program "increases the public's
confidence in and respect for our system of justice and, by giving the
parties a service they really value, increases their sense of gratitude toward
the government and their sense of connection to our' society." 101 This
gratitude, in turn, helps the public accept "the legitimacy of having
democratically developed norms govern relations within our country." 10 2
Indeed, Judge Brazil posits that "over time, in a democracy, the people will
comply only if they trust and respect the courts as institutions." 103
Unfortunately, the people of central and eastern Europe may perceive
the legal system as too corrupt for any court mediation program connected
with it to be impartial. 104 For instance, the former republics of the
U.S.S.R. and certain African nations have largely rejected court-sponsored
mediation and "are building mediating processes in places where there is no
respect for the formal institutional structure."'105 Although the legal systems
there might benefit from a successful design; the odor of past injustices and
present incompetence may cling too strongly to allow any mediation
program to succeed.
As analyzed earlier, the people also view the central and eastern
European governments with mistrust. Consequently, any successful
mediation design should not be wholly implemented by either the legal
system or the government. Yet, unlike the scarcity of court programs,
several governmental mediation efforts are currently in place in these
countries. Given the existence of several university-based mediation
programs throughout central and eastern Europe, I believe that the optimal
design would be a blend of government, academic, and community
involvement.
For example, dispute resolution governmental agencies could work in
tandem with the university-based conflict resolution centers. Experimental
101 Brazil, supra note 1, at 738 (arguing that a high-quality court mediation
program with paid court mediators is the most effective model for courts).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 See Interview with Josh Stulberg, Professor of Law, The Ohio State University
College of Law, in Columbus, Ohio (Mar. 18, 1999).
105 Shonholtz, supra note 81, at 142.
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pilot projects could be established in areas of conflict resolution education
and training and the facilitation and mediation of ethnic conflict. University
neutrals could educate their governmental counterparts in conflict resolution
education, and both groups could provide similar educational seminars to
local communities. The governmental agency would work in a similar
fashion to those located in the United States and act as a clearinghouse for
information and expertise.
In addition to a governmental agency, panels could be founded
throughout the countries in various population centers. These would be
composed of a governmental mediator, an academic mediator, and a
mediator chosen from the local community. This three-part panel would
help offset inherent skepticism of governmental manipulation and
simultaneously increase involvement at the community level. The panel
would be empowered to facilitate and mediate local disputes, and could act
as a resource for individual education and training. In addition to covering
local disputes these panels could facilitate governmental meetings at all
levels of government. Finally, these panels also could be responsible for
facilitation and mediation of ethnic disputes on an as needed basis, so that
disputants could have a neutral forum in which to air their grievances
before those grievances become violent. Essentially, this design will enable
participants to improve their ability to communicate constructively and
creatively in the midst of conflict. In short, the design has the potential for
reducing ethnic strife within the central and eastern European countries, as
well as shoring up emerging democracies by teaching citizens
communication skills necessary in any successful democracy.106
VI. CONCLUSION
The emerging postsocialist legal institutions of central and eastern
Europe do not currently embody the democratic ideals of procedural equity
and substantive fairness. Both the judiciary and political leaders have been
compromised by their respective pasts under socialism and as a result are
not trusted by the populace. In addition, ethnic conflict throughout central
and eastern Europe has risen to unmanageable proportions and threatens to
derail the transformation from socialism to democracy. Therefore, in order
to prevent their newly formed governments from disintegrating into some
form of authoritative structure, central and eastern Europe must find ways
106 For more analysis and a description of these pilot projects, see generally Emily
Stewart Haynes, Designing a Dispute Resolution System for Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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to educate their people about democracy and revitalize their legal system.
Essentially, this revitalization is necessary so that the principle of self-
governance can be embraced throughout all levels of social and political
life.
Mediation can play an essential role in this educational process. By
structuring a neutral setting in which parties can creatively resolve their
own disputes, mediation can demonstrate through example the values of
democracy and responsible decisionmaking. Mediation also can be used as
a means of eliciting public opinion regarding governmental policies and
programs. As evidenced in Part I of this Note, central and eastern
European governments currently utilize mediation in a variety of disputes.
Several countries also have established connections with foreign mediators
and permit education on mediation at the university level. Although
relatively sparse, these examples show that central and eastern European
countries have, to some extent, realized the benefits of mediation. Given
the ability of mediation to address pressing social and political problems in
the transformation from socialism to democracy, these governments should
establish mediation programs that reach all levels of the populations. These
programs should perform a variety of culturally sensitive processes that
educate both the people and government in skills basic to any flourishing
democracy-cooperation and compromise.

